Across Ukraine, a similar situation can be found along the entire contact line, from North to East to South.
With a few notable exceptions, the Russians are simply holding firm and are not engaging in ‘big arrow’ offensives; sweeping advances by large formations intent upon capturing swathes of territorial or geographical real-estate.
In the bulk of locations, they are attacking locally, maintaining active defence operations, and effectively pinning the Ukrainians to their front. At the same time, they are utilising their commanding advantage in drone, air and artillery operations to degrade Ukrainian supply and manpower concentrations, disrupt Ukrainian attempts to evacuate the wounded or rotate front line troops, destroy Ukrainian air-defence systems, and engage in effective counter-battery fire.
Given the rapidly-degrading state of Ukrainian air-defence systems and associated munitions, drone attacks against these high-value targets are becoming increasingly significant and successful. As the capability of Ukraine’s air-defence systems is reduced, so the utilisation and effectiveness of Russian air assets will inevitably increase.
In overall terms of manpower and equipment the cost is very high for the Ukrainians (unsustainably so) while the comparative cost for the Russians is very low.
In certain local areas – Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Marinka, Vuhledar, for example – the Russians are engaged in more active offensive attempts to attack and capture strategically-important (from the Ukrainian perspective) towns, cities and settlements. Yet even here, the attrition rate is massively in the Russian favour. Russian casualties are higher under these circumstances than in other areas, of course, but then so are those suffered by the Ukrainians. In such places, which have drawn in a constant supply of reinforcements, the Ukrainians have committed themselves to fierce, stubborn and often courageous defence.
Despite this stubborn defence however, the battle for Bakhmut has, to date, been reduced to a block of high-rise buildings to the west of the city. As of writing, Ukraine holds less than 10% of Bakhmut.
There are no roads leading from Bakhmut still open for Ukrainian use that are not under fire-control from Russian artillery. In some areas the Russians are frequently able to engage Ukrainian vehicles and personnel on such roads (which are littered with mangled, ruined vehicles and unretrieved corpses), with small arms, RPGs and mortars.
Overall then, a fair assessment would be that this situation is playing perfectly into the Russian war goals, whether locally or theatre-wide. The application of the Russian plans, whether operational, strategic or tactical, are deadly for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Personal opinion and assessment :
Time is on the side of the Russians.
They have an overwhelming advantage in manpower, equipment, supplies, ammunition (of all kinds), and with the industrial and economic capacity to far outlast the Ukrainians, even accounting for the ever-dwindling state of resupply and training from NATO, the EU, UK and USA.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the casualties suffered to date, and the losses that are ongoing, are simply unsustainable for Ukraine. In this brutal war of attrition, eventual victory for the Russians is assured. It is inevitable.
Assessment of all things Russian by NATO, the US and Ukraine, have proven to be fundamentally mistaken. The poor understanding of the reality of the ‘Russian War Machine’ has plagued western military thought, planning and application for decades. This woeful ‘understanding’ of Russia and her military is persistent and continues despite evidence.
Generally-speaking, the skill of Russian service personnel and the effectiveness of their training, officer competence, battlefield application of manpower formations and a plethora of high-quality equipment… their ability to utilise combined arms, intelligence and communication systems, coupled with a well-developed, integrated resupply/retool/repair doctrine, alongside successful application of their superior strategic and tactical prowess… is abundantly evident.
In short, ‘the west’ has seriously underestimated Russia, not least in her industrial and economic capacity, but also in her preparedness for conflict and the level of support amongst Russian civilians both towards Putin and the aims of the military operation in Ukraine.
Which is not to say that Russia is militarily flawless; it isn’t. It’s also true that Russia has suffered costly setbacks, and will continue to. From the Russian perspective, this is a war against an enemy capable of causing damage.
However, in terms of conventional warfare, Ukraine cannot win.
It’s also becoming evident that NATO (and each of it’s constituent members) is not as capable an instrument of defence (let alone offence) as we were led to believe. Decades of successful military expeditions against non-peer (in military, economic and industrial capacity, and preparedness terms) opponents, have created a grossly overblown view of the capacity of NATO and of each individual member state, including the USA.
From a non-NATO, non-aligned perspective, the emperor has been shown to be rather embarassingly naked.
The fact of the nuclear superpower status of Russia severely limits the conventional scope and military options of Ukraine and NATO. As it should. We’ve been told of the ‘deterrence’ nature of nuclear weapons for decades so it should come as no surprise that they are a limiting factor in terms of what Ukraine and NATO can do to win this war.
If Russia did not have nuclear weapons, NATO could forward plenty of bogus reasons to put NATO boots on the ground in Ukraine. There would be little Russia could do to dissuade her enemies from doing so, short of drawing in her own clutch of allies. Targets within Russia would also be open to attack, including her industrial capacity to wage war.
Without her nuclear weapons, Russia might be facing a conventional WWIII as a rehash of WWII.
Yet we know WWII ultimately led, at great cost, to a Soviet victory.
Therefore, with or without her nuclear weapons, Russia is a foe beyond Ukraine.
As I have been saying for over a year, to understand how to fight the Russians, you must recognise that from their perspective this is a war of attrition and not a war for territory or geographical conquest. The ground itself is not the priority for Russia; they are more than willing to trade ground either to reduce their own casualties or lure the Ukrainians forward into a kill-zone. The optics and propaganda-value of holding and gaining ground are far less important for Russia. Russia understands that Ukraine cannot sustain high-losses in manpower or equipment and that therefore, the most efficient manner of ‘winning’ is to kill Ukrainian soldiers and destroy Ukrainian equipment.
Ukraine, however, is enamoured (for a variety of reasons) of the ground. They consider ‘victory’ to be a matter of territorial gain and geographical capture. They are evidently willing to sacrifice the lives of their military and suffer crippling losses in equipment in order to hold ground, either in terms of trenchwork fortifications or with respect to cities such as Bakhmut.
Ukrainian doctrine therefore is perhaps greatly influenced by NATO and the west, where large-scale, big-arrow offensives are the means of victory. Hence we have been waiting for the Ukrainian counter-offensive since winter, having been told that it will break the Russians, perhaps split the southern land-bridge from Rostov to Sevastopol, recapture Mariupol and Melitopol, and bring Crimea back under Ukrainian control. Bakhmut, we have been promised, will never fall.
Ukraine has been fighting like this since February 2022. For over a year, her forces have been severely degraded, her losses have been catastrophic and she is no closer to any semblance of victory. In fact, the Russians have only grown stronger since the war began.
The only realistic option for Ukraine would be to create and maintain a space between the armies which would allow sufficient protection for their own troops and create conditions to their front such that the Russians would suffer horrific and debilitating losses should they approach. Should the Russians not approach, then the Ukrainians must be able to inflict horrific and debilitating losses against those more distant forces. Under such conditions, the Russians would suffer great losses whether they entrenched themselves or undertook offensive operations.
In other words, the Ukrainians must fight an attritional war themselves, and one in which the ratio of casualties and equipment loss were massively in their favour.
Given the size and scope of the Russian military, this approach is arguably a pipe-dream and also a doctrine long-past any ability to implement. Given the historic ability of Russia to withstand horrific loss and yet still achieve victory, I can’t see any chance of military battlefield success for Ukraine should she adopt such a doctrine.
As a swift aside, I cannot see how any Ukrainian offensive can succeed with even limited objectives, let alone anything ‘war-winning’ intended to recapture the Donbas, Crimea or break the land-corridor from Rostov to Sevastopol. The Russians are prepared, with multiple layers of fortified positions (echelon defence). Attempting such a thing would be sheer lunacy.
That said, had Ukraine implemented an attritional approach from the outset then there may have been a possibility that Russian losses would have been severe enough, and as a result Putin so pressured by the prospect of projected large-scale casualties, that a diplomatic solution could have been found more swiftly, potentially including terms and conditions more favourable for Ukraine.
This could have been accompanied by a less pugilistic and more conciliatory approach on behalf of ‘the west,’ including a guarantee to maintain the neutrality of Ukraine and reduce her military capacity (for example). Such an approach, without any implementation of sanctions from the EU, USA and UK (say) might have been sufficient to bring a halt to the conflict sooner.
Of course, as I have said, had the west (particularly the USA) refrained from beligerent manoeuvreing and interference in Ukraine, had a more fraternal and sincere understanding and concessions been proffered to the population of the Donbas, had NATO refused to expand into Ukraine, had a Ukrainian government been left to determine – for itself – whether to face west or east or even a little of both, then we would never have found ourselves in this situation in the first place.
So. We are where we are. With Ukraine facing the prospect of total defeat and Russia dictating terms at her pleasure.
The only option for Ukraine to halt the conflict immediately would be to call an instant ceasefire and enter into surrender negotiations. Defeat is an inevitability. The only issue now is the preservation of life and to retain as much of Ukraine as possible.
Unfortunately unpalatable, I fear, and difficult to sell.