Ukraine cannot go toe-to-toe with Russia, despite the huge assistance of her western partners; doing so has cost Ukraine army after army. Ukraine has received and is receiving hand-me-downs. Ukraine are on the brink of collapse.
It is also true to say that Ukraine/NATO/US are losing by the terms of their own victory conditions, aims and goals.
So… judge Ukraine in territorial/geographic/manoeuvre offensive terms. But not Russia. Judge Ukraine against NATO doctrinal expectations. But not Russia.
NATO/US
NATO troops are no more or less competent than Ukrainian troops, particularly with regards to Ukraine’s initial army, in terms of effectiveness or experience.
Many of Ukraine’s current troops far more experienced than NATO troops and that they would have more success dropping NATO doctrine entirely; something they cannot and will not do as they are slaved to NATO. NATO/US need to listen to those experienced officers and soldiers. Badly.
No amount of current NATO training could have prepared for fighting in Bakhmut, or for the experience of suffering in a hole (or the losses incurred) under 20-60k Russian shells per day, for example.
Ukraine put up a great fight in Bakhmut, and NATO troops would do the same… but the victory would still go to Russia, I think.
NATO has necessary doctrinal expectations that do not apply against a foe like Russia. For example… Fixed wing air. Rotary wing air. Artillery. SigInt. Logistics. Intel. Asset. Asset-suppression. Equipment. Elan. Counter-battery. Air-defence. Training. Industrial. Stockpile. Supply. Repair and maintenance. Rotation. Resources. It is a long list of ‘necessaries.’
There have been historical instances where all of the above dominances have led to swift and rapid victory, such as in Kuwait/Iraq. And instances where those dominances, though present, failed to gift victory, such as Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan. But, with the exception of Korea, the US (also NATO) hasn’t fought a peer army since 1945; an enemy capable of denying some of those necessary dominances, and an enemy with dominances of their own.
The simplest example I can think of is US Carrier Doctrine. Four carriers, say – all that cost, all that reliance, all that power-projection, around 18k lives, all that confidence and strength and associated self-belief and preening… gone with a generous handful of hypersonic missiles. Anyway, not applicable to this theatre, just an easy example is all.
We will see what happens when the un-peer-tested, much-vaunted (and vital) US/NATO doctrinal expectation of air-dominance capacity is put to some test.
In my opinion, I think it would cause a great deal of disappointment once top-guns start tumbling from the skies, in a similar manner as the reality of mangled and destroyed Leopards hits home – Leopards that never even managed to get a single shot off.
As for the US, they’ve had losses on foreign soil (historically) but afaik haven’t had to rebuild anything on home soil since Vicksburg. Certainly nothing on the scale of Caen or Dresden, for example, or Sarajevo. Or Bakhmut, of course.
This kind of experience has a value.
I have visited the US many times and have decades-long friends there. A traditional Thanksgiving is an awesome experience. I am certainly not anti-American.
But when it comes to issues of ‘strength’ and dick-measuring, yanks are more often arrogant, presumptive, overweening and dismissive of their foe. And it’s not an ‘earned’ or real advantage. It’s puff and mirage. And selective in terms of precedent. The bad news is that this appears to be the current situation in Washington and throughout US media, and not just within some of the population. The US needs cooler heads.
This ‘belief’ has led to mighty military fuck-ups, particularly early-on in US deployment in theatre… during WW1 with Persching at Meuse-Argonne (120k losses and eerily similar situations to the front in Ukraine) and more famously, perhaps, during WW2 at Kasserine Pass.
Of course, as with all armies given the time and space to learn, they DO learn and adapt and improve… as the yanks did (more in WW2 than WW1 it has to be said)… but I mention such things only to highlight that mischaracterisation mixed with swinging-dick syndrome has always led to disaster. I see no evidence that the same scenario might not play out should US/NATO troops go into Ukraine, dicks swinging, accompanied by ‘Halls of Montezuma.’
Nothing has gone according to plan in Ukraine for NATO/US/UK. Nothing. Militarily, economically. And the reason? Russia and the Russians.
Russia
To explain my understanding of the ‘Russian perspective’ entails a view of the war/SMO that radically differs from the western narrative. So… in abbreviated (numbers are estimated), simplistic form…
Phase One – to April/May 2022
Russia invaded Ukraine with 120-150k men. 20-30k were tasked with ‘the rush on Kiev’ which included an attack on Gostomel and a successful cutting of the approach roads from the west. Simultaneously 15-20k troops advanced around Sumy and towards Kyiv, and another 15-20k troops (alongside 20k LPR soldiers) advanced throughout the Kharkiv region. 40k troops advanced from Crimea, taking Kherson and much of the northern bank of the Dnieper as well as a small contingent sent east towards Energodar, Melitopol and Kamiansk. Another force of 40k, supplemented with 15k Chechen troops and 20k DPR troops advanced through Sartana and began to encircle and capture Mariupol.
The purpose of this initial phase was to panic Zelenskyy into making immediate concessions to avoid catastrophe. As a result in negotiations in Turkey, an agreement was signed by Russia and Ukraine that would have ended the war right there and then. This would have proven the value of Russia’s military actions to date.
In a show of ‘good faith’ Russia withdrew her troops from the northern zone, which included Kiev and the Chernihiv and Sumy regions. At no point was Russia forced – militarily – to withdraw from any of these regions. Russian troops in those areas, under orders to withdraw, did so in good order, despite being sporadically attacked by Ukrainian air assets.
This gambit was a failure on behalf of Russia. However, troops were not withdrawn from Kharkiv and other eastern and southern regions, indicating that whatever the outcome of the gambit, those territories were vital to Russia’s overall goals.
Phase Two – to September 2022
Russian forces were increased in order to facilitate capture and consolidation of Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. Fall of Lyman, Severodonetsk and Lysichansk. Advances towards Bakhmut.
In September, Ukraine began a two-part offensive which ultimately resulted in the withdrawal (again, in good order) of the flimsy, understrength Russian forces (predominantly Rosgvardiya ‘National Guard’ units) lightly occupying the Kharkiv region to stronger defence lines (which they have held ever since), bolstered by troops redeployed from the earlier northern operations towards Kiev.
Russia began a period of ‘partial mobilisation’ finally bolstering Russian forces from the initial tranch (which was not tasked in the north with a direct offensive military action) of 150k men, with a further 300k from the reserve. LPR and DPR troops were also increased by 10k each.
Ukraine also initiated an offensive in the Kherson region (north of the Dneiper) which led to transient success, at best; best characterised as to-and-fro.
September came to a close with the referenda and beginning of the annexation process of the four eastern and southern oblasts.
Phase Three – to May 2023
Following a front-line review, in November 2022 Russia withdrew troops (yet again, in good order) from the northern bank of the Dnieper in the Kherson region, to take up a defensive line on the southern bank, which they have held ever since.
A ‘winter offensive’ was conducted by Russia in which a continual advance was made following victory at Popasna through Soledar towards Bakhmut, which fell on May 20th.
Phase Four – to July 2023
Ukraine launched two counteroffensives, one in the vicinity of Bakhmut and the other across the southern Zaporizhzhia region. To date, these offensive manoeuvres have been a dismal, disappointing failure. A glance beyond the combat-line in both of these areas reveals a deep network of Russian defensive fortifications almost a year in the making.
Analysis – From Day One
The initial force that advanced towards Kiev and operated around Chernihiv and Sumy was not intended to conquer or capture anything; it withdrew as a ‘gesture of good faith’ with regard to the Ankara negotiations.
The Russian withdrawals from Kharkiv and Kherson were undertaken for Russian positional advantage. Everyone, I mean everyone, has continually misattributed those events as Ukrainian ‘victories’ which has fed into a misguided faith in the offensive capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
US/NATO doctrine is predominantly offensive manoeuvre. That’s a serious miscalculation against a peer opponent intending to attrite (demilitarise).
US/NATO are not cocerned with ‘preservation’ of anything, whether manpower, assets or supplies; a situation caused by a series of non-relevant, non-peer wars since Korea, determined by overconfidence in its own exceptionalism, over-reliance on shiny (over-engineered, over-spec’d, made-for-profit over utility) stonking equipment, and ‘superior, world-renowned logistics and firepower.’
This US/NATO doctrine has far too many inter-dependencies upon ‘dominances’ that must be in place for success, from fire-based static arty, to air-superiority etc… none of which were/are within the capacity of the AFU to achieve.
To my eye, Russia has frequently ‘goaded’ Ukraine into undertaking offensive operations (at localised points across the entire frontline) by using active defence and limited localised village/positional-capture ops that the AFU has been hell-bent on recapturing. This means that by their own design and by design of the Russians, the AFU has been engaged in continual offensive operations against the Russians. Given the kill-ratio advantage for defending forces normally associated with such a state, coupled with the echelon-defence doctrine, an updated active-defence strategy, overwhelming missile/arty capabilities of the Russians, superior AD/EW/SigInt systems, and the prepared defensive structures created in depth by the Russians, the kill ratio has been massively in favour of Russia throughout.
From day one. Continually. Day after day.
So. A fundamental misreading of early ‘victories,’ coupled with fatal NATO training and influence… both of which led to the lunacy of perpetual offensive ops against a fully-prepared opponent, alongside ‘perfect’ (for this theatre and this conflict) Russian operational, strategic and tactical application that played to her own strengths, schedule, and war goals, and far more suitable asset use… is why we are where we currently are.
Russia have been in control of everything. They have continually-maintained the initiative even under circumstances that normally would not apply. Ukraine has done exactly what Russia wanted, at every turn. Demilitarisation has worked, is working, and will cause sudden collapses at which time Russia will be able to shift to their own variant of manoeuvre operations at far less cost and with far more success. The timing for this shift is under constant ‘audit’ by the Russian MoD, as they have admitted.