In this post from March 4th 2022, I made a number of predictions regarding the military situation in Ukraine and how it might develop over the course of the conflict. Given recent (credible) reports (from a variety of sources) that estimate Ukrainian losses of 100,000 killed and 400,000 wounded, I thought I would revisit and develop those earlier predictions.
Over the course of the war to date, there have been a number of significant events, not least of which have been the three Russian withdrawals;
- 1st – From Sumy, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr and Kiev Oblasts – Completed April 4th
- 2nd – From Kharkiv Oblast – Completed September 10th
- 3rd – From Northern Kherson Oblast – Completed November 9th
I’ll return to these specifics shortly but will work through the military predictions from the previous post in order.
This war will ultimately be determined by artillery (a doctrinal element massively in Russia’s favour) and small/large-scale local encirclements creating cauldrons resulting in continuous and debilitating casualties for Ukraine as the weeks and months pass.
I think the artillery point holds. The vast bulk of Ukrainian losses appear to have been caused by Russian artillery. The coordinated firepower of well-targeted and well-supplied Russian artillery has been key in halting small and large scale Ukrainian offensive operations as well as reducing Ukrainian defensive positions across all theatres. I do not see this doctrine changing; it has been and will remain the primary determiner of the attritional war from the Russian perspective.
Russia will periodically strike logistic and transport hubs behind the contact line. However, I do not foresee the targeting of energy production facilities (power stations) or a widescale destruction of non-strategic road bridges, or purely civilian infrastructure and economic/commercial facilities. I believe that the Russian civilian population and leadership will neither seek nor support avoidable casualties amongst the Ukrainian population as an imperative.
Proven to be the case. Given the Ukrainian predilection for continually shelling Donetsk, I find Russian retaliatory restraint in kind, illuminating.
Through use of air/sea/land-launched missile strikes, Russia will reduce Ukraine’s power-distribution facilities thus impacting the logistical rail network (mostly run through electric locomotives), oil and gas storage and processing facilities, and petrol/diesel stores, particularly if the need arises for Ukraine to redeploy troops across oblasts. The most-damaging time for such energy-facility infrastructure attacks could be as the rains come in late-autumn/early winter/spring (for obvious, somewhat muddy, reasons).
The campaign against power-distribution facilities came in September (after the Ukrainian attack upon the Kerch Strait/Crimean bridge) and following the Russian withdrawal from Kherson – and thus the Ukrainian opportunity to redeploy forces from that oblast to theatres in the east. Ukrainian resilience against such targeted missile attacks is waning. I think the Russians will ‘top-up’ these attacks such that any repair attempts will prove fruitless.
As the aim of the war, from a Russian perspective, is the ‘demilitarisation’ of Ukraine, I am certain that we will see the destruction of the in-theatre Ukrainian forces over time, and at a hugely favourable (war-winning) ratio for the Russians. This will be, I believe, the overarching attritional ‘tactic’ of the Russian leadership and all military operations. For those that will judge the conflict on a territorial basis, this will (I’m sure) cloud their forthcoming analyses and understanding but I am convinced that ‘geography’ will be a lesser tactical and strategic concern.
Ukrainian equipment will be destroyed, replacements will be destroyed, repair-facilities will be destroyed, resupply capacity will be destroyed… manpower will be exhausted… until the airforce ceases to be operationally capable and the army increasingly reliant on civilian SUV’s or reduced to static trench-warfare.
Ukraine will see it’s own current soviet equipment/systems comprehensively destroyed, followed by anything supplied (piecemeal and with lessening impact over time) by the west… until Russia thoroughly dominates and can dictate whatever terms they wish.
With reference to matériel that may be supplied to Ukraine from western sources, this may perhaps initially involve such equipment and systems with which the Ukrainians are themselves familiar, are trained and skilled with, and that can be repaired and maintained.
There are few countries that could gift such equipment and no obvious means of self-replenishment.
Current Ukrainian fixed and rotary aircraft, artillery, tanks, armoured-personnel and assault vehicles, air-defence systems etc… and any armament/ammunition/spare-parts required… are predominantly ex-soviet (though some with recent modification/upgrade). Such matériel is not standard for most NATO/western countries. Given that Ukraine will be industrially-incapable of manufacturing any replacements… once the initial Ukrainian hardware is attrited, and the trickle of relevant western-supplied ex-soviet hardware runs dry… there are few viable alternatives.
The Ukrainian military are unfamiliar with the vast bulk of NATO hardware. Training takes time and though I’m sure western nations will offer such assistance, it will not be able to keep pace with battlefield losses, either in terms of manpower or equipment.
Should such NATO matériel be provided, this would provoke (perhaps insurmountable) training, supply, repair and maintenance issues. There are also limitations in the stockpiles of western nations who, I am sure, will be unwilling to provide matériel to Ukraine to the detriment of their own defence requirements. Such limitations will become highly relevant when it comes to armaments and ammunition, particularly for artillery and air/ground missile systems. We shall see.
Accurate, to date.
As I mentioned, given that a stated aim of the war is demilitarisation… territory, in terms of geographical real-estate (and ‘big name’ cities) will be less important. This means that the Russians will choose positions that give an easy defensive capability (well-protected by overwhelming, interlinked, and accurate artillery to the rear) perhaps based upon river/rail/hardpoint features… rather than insist upon acquiring and holding mere cartographic area (as will perhaps dominate the Ukrainian/Western mind).
Given such… large and small-scale Russian withdrawals, redeployments, readjustments and redistributions may occur and should, actually, be expected.
I think the initial swift advances across Ukraine were a broad attempt to cause fear and panic in the Zelenskyy government and thus to force a diplomatic, negotiated peace. This failed due, in most part, to the belligerent involvement of the UK, US, NATO and EU. This failure led to the first withdrawal of Russian forces in Sumy, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr and Kiev Oblasts.
A second territorial withdrawal took place in the Kharkiv oblast. I believe this was due to an overextension of Russian forces and (partially) through the success of the Ukrainian armed forces in penetrating a weakly-held region causing the Russian position to become untenable. Though this was a Ukrainian battlefield success, the Russians withdrew in good order. The current Russian line in this theatre remains open to attack, however.
The initial force designated for the ‘special military operation (SMO)’ by Russia has been estimated at 150,000 men, with a further 50-60,000 men available from the Lugansk and Donetsk authorities and the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC). Once the negotiation ‘gamble’ failed, the 30-40,000 men assigned to the advance upon Kiev were redeployed to other theatres. However, prior to the October completion of Russian mobilisation (of 300-500,000 men), it is apparent that the Russians had not committed sufficient force to the SMO to cover all theatres adequately. Thus the redeployment of the force from the advance upon Kiev proved insufficient to bolster Russian forces across the entire front. Ukrainian success in Kharkiv oblast appears to highlight this initial, overall lack of Russian sufficiency.
A third (and surprising to most observers) withdrawal took place from Kherson and the territory north of the Dniepr in the Kherson oblast. Again, this withdrawal followed months of Ukrainian offensive pressure and a change in Russian military command that followed a re-appraisal of the situation in this area. The withdrawal was undertaken in good order and for clearly-advantageous reasons for the Russians. All Ukrainian offensive operations over the previous months had been repulsed and contained, such that forward momentum on behalf of Ukraine became virtually impossible. Losses to Ukraine in these offensive operations were high, if not catastrophic. The Russian position in this theatre is now firm, secure and solid.
To some degree, this overall approach will be influenced by the Ukrainian appetite for offensive operations; if and when they attempt large-scale offensive/counter-offensive attacks, I believe the Russians will be content to sit back and attrite such forces. Only when the Ukrainian forces are sufficiently degraded will the Russians themselves undertake large-scale offensive operations.
Therefore it is possible that as time passes and Ukrainian strength bleeds away, the Russians may shift from attrition to territorial/positional goal-achievement through offensive operations.
Accurate, to date. Russian forces allocated to the SMO are now estimated as being 500-600,000. As yet there has not been a large-scale Russian offensive ground operation. I believe this to be but a matter of time and opportunity (determined by weather and air-superiority).
I should reiterate that, from the Russian perspective, the primary operational goal is demilitarisation. Clearly stated, this goal entails the complete destruction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It does not require territorial gain or the capture of cities or towns. The Russians are not engaged in a geographical capture exercise. They are engaged in killing Ukrainian soldiers and destroying equipment and supply requirements (fuel, ammunition etc).
This is a war of attrition. As such it is brutal, deadly and focused.
Russia has the public support, the manpower, the equipment and materiel, the logistical capability, the industrial and economic capacity and the time to reduce the Ukrainian Armed Forces to the point where they are incapable of fighting, at which point Russia will be free to act in whatever political or military manner they deem fit.
Ukrainian manpower and support vehicles simply cannot withstand the overwhelming Russian artillery firepower, whether in prepared positions or not. Any and every Ukrainian brigade sent to the front will be destroyed, as will any replacements/reinforcements whose quality and combat-effectiveness will reduce greatly as the fighting continues.
Ukrainian artillery will suffer counter-battery and attacks from Russian air-assets (including Lancet drones and such) until they become ineffective and are silenced (from destruction or lack of ammunition).
Any NATO ground-equipment sent to Ukraine (Challengers, Abrams, Leopards etc) as replacements will greatly complicate the logistical, supply, training and maintenance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They will also suffer attrition, as has the ground-equipment that Ukraine began this conflict with. They are also a finite variable. They will have little effect.
The Ukrainian predilection for grand ‘offensives’ as NATO military (and political) doctrine and training insists upon, simply plays into the hands of the Russians. The Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have the capacity to punch a hole into the Russians that would result in a Ukrainian victory or any ‘negotiation from a position of strength.’ With each ‘offensive’ the Ukrainians would suffer the very attrition that the Russians desire and seek. Ukraine simply does not have the capacity of Napoleon or the WW2 Wehrmacht to reach Moscow and even if they did, please remember what ultimately happened to those historical French and German armies.
A major change in the dynamic of the conflict will be when Russia is able to establish air-superiority. I believe this will first be achieved locally (in certain areas of the contact line, for example the Donetsk front which would include the towns of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Ukrainian positions further to the rear such as Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and Pokrovsk) as Ukrainian air-defence systems are destroyed or run out of missiles.
When the overall air-defence systems are degraded or rendered ineffective, Russia will have achieved total air-superiority over the entire theatre. At this point the rate-of-attrition for the Ukrainian forces will accelerate exponentially.
As I understand it, the Ukrainians rely primarily upon Soviet-era S300 and BUK SA-11 systems. Missiles for these systems are certainly not abundant and once depleted these systems will be rendered useless. There are few sources for replenishment and no country has a finite supply of missiles for these systems. Once gone, they’re gone.
Given the inevitability of the degradation of their air-defence capability, Ukraine will have no other option but to attempt to incorporate less-effective, shorter-range NATO air-defence systems (Gepard, Avenger, Patriot etc) but these will come with logistical, training and supply/resupply complications, too. Besides, the Russians will simply take the time to destroy ANY air-defence system that Ukraine acquires and deploys.
The Ukrainian Air Force has already been massively reduced in effectiveness and mirrors the problems that their ground-based air-defence systems have, in that the Air Force comprises Soviet-era fighters armed with Soviet-era missiles. The fighters cannot be replenished and neither can the missile stocks. The ability of the Ukrainian Air Force to halt the inevitability of Russian air-superiority will be fleeting and transitory at best. They have already been forced to operate from road-runways. Once this requirement is reached, the writing is on the wall for any air force (in a similar way as the over-reliance and utilisation of civilian vehicles indicates for any ground force).
As an aside, should NATO ignore the escalatory effects and supply NATO fighters (F-16s etc) and relevant armaments to Ukraine, Russia will simply destroy them as they have already destroyed the Ukrainian Air Force to date. All such a move will achieve is to delay the inevitable. F-16s (or whatever) will also vastly complicate the logistical, training and supply/resupply of the Ukrainian Air Force, again.
Sometime in the late spring or early summer 2023, this shift towards Russian air-superiority will manifest itself, at which time Russia will be able to deploy bombers and increase the capacity for their aviation to undertake ground-support and strike missions. As and when the Russians begin to deploy FAB-500 and UPAB-1500 glide bombs (with a range up to 60km), I believe that this will signify that they have achieved a localised air-superiority.
Once the Russians attain air-superiority, whether local or theatre-wide, the end to the conflict will be in sight.
It is inevitable.
The success of those future operations may be determined by the ability of the Ukrainians to withhold, protect and maintain their own artillery and ammunition (during the attrition phase), and thus their own capacity to cause significant casualties to the advancing Russians as they shift to the offensive as the conflict develops.
I doubt this will be the case. It may prove to be too little, too late and the Russians will – almost certainly – attempt to engage in effective counter-battery operations during the attrition phase as a priority.
Besides, Ukrainian military doctrine and force-training is based upon that of NATO. Therefore, I very much doubt that they will take time and the preservation of force into much consideration.
Interestingly, as of 3rd December, Ukraine has completed transfer of three artillery brigades to the ‘eastern’ front. Specifically in support of the Ukrainian positions facing Svatove (45th), Bakhmut (40th) and Donetsk (55th). While these redeployments will certainly assist Ukraine in those theatres, they will also certainly suffer counter-battery and attrition from the Russians. Ukrainian artillery is, I believe, a highly-valuable resource. It is being deployed in the Bakhmut and Donetsk theatres for defensive purposes. When the time comes for Russian offensive operations, I believe these brigades will be far less effective in their ability to blunt or even halt such attacks.
NATO is dominated by US doctrine and experience acquired and practiced over decades, characterised by shock and awe and massive, overpowering domination… against opponents with little or no air capacity (offensive or defensive), little or no artillery and no significant counter-battery capability, few technologically equivalent (or superior) systems, and troops with poor training and morale; from nations with no military industrial capacity for manufacture, ability to repair, retool or replace equipment/ammunition, or significant economic resources or strength to wage war. To my understanding, the US/NATO has not faced military (or economic) equivalency in an opponent since Korea.
The US military (and ‘the west’ generally) is enamoured of technological ‘wonder-weaponry’ and has a blinding belief in it’s own excellence and superiority, alongside an overweening faith in it’s own destructive firepower and military dominance (particularly in systems). It also mocks, denigrates and evidences contempt for the ability, capability, professionalism and capacity of the Russian military, an approach that I am sure has been instilled throughout the Ukrainian military; a fatal mistake.
However with regards to this conflict, not only would all of this be an inappropriate miscalculation, but Russia has a long – and highly relevant – history and tradition of comprehensively and decisively defeating such opponents. It should also be pointed out that Russia has experience in fighting over this territory before (documented, detailed and researched, I’m sure).
That said, the most difficult theatre for the Russians will be to the west of Donetsk, where the Ukrainians have – over eight years – built a long and deep network of defences which include linked conurbations, trenches and bunkered fortifications. However, much like the Maginot line, this defence line does not extend across the entire front and will eventually become encircled and/or punched-through… though at some cost to the Russians. Ukrainian forces in these fortifications will, of course, be pinned and suffer attrition through artillery strikes. Trench warfare and the reliance upon fortified hardpoints has, historically, only served to delay the inevitable; such a reliance has never won a war (though it has contributed to winning battles).
Russia has the will and the time to dictate all aspects of this conflict and Ukraine will eventually have no ability to meaningfully counter-attack or impact the ultimate outcome.
I still hold to this assessment.
Ukraine simply cannot and will not prevail. Russia will achieve all of it’s territorial objectives (assuming no Ukrainian political collapse) by July/August 2022 at the earliest (a timescale dictated by western ‘military aid’ tranches alongside western diplomatic interference)… more likely during the winter of 2023)… which will include at minimum the Oblasts of Lugansk/Donetsk (including Mariupol), Kherson (specifically the left-bank of the Dniepr), Zaporizhzhia (to the Dniepr), and perhaps even Odesa and Mykolaiv.
Should Ukraine refuse a diplomatic solution, Russia may eventually advance to capture the entire area of south/east Ukraine up to the Dniepr.
We shall see.